having probability 1 for A, because probability 1 is incorrigible2; but plain belief is clearly corrigible. And believing A is not the same as giving A a probability larger than some 1-e, because believing A and believing B is usually taken to be equivalent to believing A-an d -B . 3 Thus, it seems that the formal representation of plain belief has to take a non-probabilistic route.
Indeed, representing plain belief seems easy enough: simply represent an epis temic state by the set of all propositions believed true in it or, since we assume plain belief to be deductively closed, by the conjunction of all propositions believed true in it. But this does not yet provide a theory of induction, i.e. an answer to the ques tion how epistemic states so represented are changed through information or expe rience. There is a convincing partial answer: if the new information is compatible with the old epistemic state, then the new epistemic state is simply represented by the conjunction of the new information and the old beliefs. This answer is partial because it does not cover the quite common case where the new information is in compatible with the old beliefs. It is, however , important to complete the answer and to cover this case, too; otherwise, we would not represent plain belief as corrigib 1 e. The problem is that there is no good completion. When epistemic states are repre-1 "Proposition" is the philosophically most common general term for the objects of belief and the one I shall use.
2 Whatever has probability 1 keeps it, according to all �les of belief change within standard probability theory.
3 I am here alluding to the so-called lottery paradox, which has gained considerable impor tance in the writings of H.E. Kyburg, jr., I. Levi, and others. Cf., e.g., the various hints in Bogdan (1982) .
sented simply by the conjunction of all propositions believed true in it, the answer cannot be completed; and to my knowledge, no other representation of epistemic states has been proposed which would really solve this problem.
In this paper, I want to suggest a solution to this problem. In my (1988) , I have more fully argued that this is the only solution, if certain plausible desiderata are to be satisfied. Here, in section 2, I will be content with formally defining and intuit ively explaining my proposal. I will compare my proposal with probability theory in section 3. We will see that the theory I am proposing is in important respects structurally homomorphic to probability theory; it thus turns out to be equally eas ily implementable, but moreover computationally simpler. Section 4 contains a very brief comparison with various kinds of logics, in particular conditional logic, with Shackle's functions of potential surprise and related theories, with Shafer's belief functions, and finally with fuzzy logic.
Theory
We have first to settle the algebraic framework. Let W be some non-empty set of possibilities (possible worlds, possible cour�es of events, or what have you). Proposi tions, denoted by A ,B ,C •·.··• are represented simply by subsets of W. Subfields of the field of all propositions will be denoted by )t,2J,C, ... 4 Usually, W will have a structure: there will be a family (W O i e 1 of variables or factors -where I is some index set and each W i (ie /) is some non-empty set -such that W = IT i e 1 W i · s That is, each we W is a function defined on I with w iE W i for all ie I and thus represents one way how all the variables may get realized. In many physical applications, e.g., each W i will be iden tical to the state space and I to the real time axis. For each J r;;. l, J1l.J is to be the field {A I for all w,w'eW, ifwj=w'i for all ieJ, then weA iff w'eA} of all propositions referring at most to the variables in J.
The central concept is now easily defined (and afterwards explained):
Definition 1: Let J1l. be a field of propositions. Then 1C is an J11. -measurable natural conditional function (J11. -NC F) iff 1C is a function from W into the set N of natural numbers such that 1e(w) = 0 for some we W and 1e(w) = 1e(w') for all atoms6 A of;�· and all w,w'eA.7 Moreover, we define for each non-empty AeJt: 1e(A) = min {1e(w) I weA}. 8
I
The measurability condition is quite obvious; it requires that an Jt-NCF does not discriminate possibilities which are not discriminated by the propositions in J1f..
The crucial question, however, is how to interpret an NCF as an epistemic state. The most accurate answer is to say that an NCF 1C represents a grading of disbelief: a possibility w with �(w)=O is not disbelieved at all in K:; if K:(w)=l, w is disbeli ev ed to 4 In the present context we may well assume W to be finite; so, we need not decide which kinds of fields to consider. In the infinite case, complete fields seem to me to be the most appro priate (cf. my (1988) ; but alternative algebraic frameworks might be used, too.
5 II denotes the Cartesian product.
· 6 A is an atom of ;I iff no proper non-empty subset of A ia a member of Jt. 1 "Conditional", because these functions can be conditionalized, as we shall see; "natural", because they take natural numbers as values. In my (1988) , I have more generally defined "ordinal conditional functions" which take ordinal numbers as values. This generality will not be needed here (all the more as it has some awkward consequences which relate to the fact that addition of ordinal numbers is not commutative). Thus, the set of propositions believed true in x: is deductively closed; and it is con sistent, because x:·l (0},.0 -as Definition 1 reasonably guarantees. Note that x:(A ) = 0 only means that A is not believed false in x:; and this is compatible with x:( -A )=0, i.e. with A also not being believed true in K.
We may also talk of integer-valued degrees of firmness of belief, i.e. we may de fine that A is believed with firmness m in K iff either x:(A )=0 and x:( -A )=m or x:(A)= -m > 0. Thus, A is believed to be true or false iff, respectively, A is believed with posit ive or negative firmness.
These explanations well agree with two simple consequences of Definition 1: (1) is the fundamental NCF-law for negation, saying that not both A and -A can be disbelieved. (2) is the fundamental NCF-law for disjunction: It is obvious that A uB should be believed at least as firmly as A and B. But Au B cannot be believed more firmly than both A and B; otherwise, it might happen that both A and B are disbe lieved, though AuB is not. In order to discover a fundamental NCF-law for conjunc tion, we have to look at conditional NCF-values.
!
This brings us to the crucial question how epistemic states represented by NCFs are changed through information or experience. Two plausible assumptions provide a complete answer. The first assumption is that, if the information immediately con . cems only the proposition A , then neither the grading of disbelief within A • nor that within -A are changed by that information. We define:
Definition 2: Let x: be an ..lt-NCF and A a non-empty proposition in ..lt. Then, the A part of 1C is to be that function x:(.IA) defined on A for which x:(w lA ) = x:(w) -x:(A ) for all we A. If Be .It and ArtB :;t: 0, we also define x:(BIA) = min {x:(wiA) I we Art B)} = x:(A rtB) -
The first assumption thus says that an information immediately concerning only A leaves the A -pan as well as the -A -pan of K unchanged, i.e. its effect can only be that these two pans are shifted in relation to one another. Definition 2, by the way, already contains the fundamental NCF-law for conjunction: The second assumption is that information about A may come in various degrees 9 -A denotes the complement or the negation of A. 1 0 A is contingent iff A and -A both are not empty. of firmness; seeing A, e.g., informs about A much more firmly than being told ab out A • Thus, the firmness with which an information is embedded in an epistemic state cannot be fixed once and for all, but has to be conceiv� as a parameter of the in formation process itself. In view of the first assumption, this parameter completely determines belief change:
Definition 3: Let 1e be an ;t-NCF, A a contingent proposition in ;t, and meN. Then the A ,m-conditionalization KA,m of 1C is defmcd as that ;t-NCF for which 'ICA,m(w) = 1e(w 1A), if we A, and KA,m(w) = m + 1e(w i-A), if we -A.
In the A ,m-conditionalization of lC, only the A -part and the -A -part of 1C are shifted in relation to one another, and A is believed with firmness m , as specified by the condi tionalization parameter.
This account of belief change may be generalized. The information may immedi ately concern not only a single proposition, but a whole field tJ3 of propositions. The parameter characterizing the information process then consists not in a single number, but in a whole ·tJ3-NCF A.. And belief change is then defined in the following way:
,,
Definition 4: I..C t ·lC be an ;t-NCF, tJ3 a subfield of ;t, and A. a tJ3-NCF. Then the /.. -condi tionalization KA. of 1e is defined as that ;t-NCF for which for all atoms B of '1J and all weB KA,(w) = A.(B) + 1e(wiB). It is to be expected that a workable concept of independence goes hand in hand with this account of conditionalization. This is indeed the case. The following defini tions are straightforward:
Definition 5: Let 1e be an ;t-NCF and tJ3 and C two subfields of ;t. Then tJ3 and Care in dependent with respect to 1e iff for all non-empty Be tJ3 and Ce C 1e(BnC) = 1e(B)+1e(C). Fur thermore, tJ3 and C are independent conditional on the proposition D w.r . t. 1e iff for all non-empty Be tJ3 and Ce C 1e(BACID) = 1C(BID)+1C(CID). How do all the concepts so defined behave? This may not be immediately perspicu ous, but the next section will provide a surprisingly powerful answer.
Comparison with probability theory
The basic definitions and formulae in the previous section look very similar to those in probability theory; we only seem to have replaced the sum, multiplication, and division of probabilities by, respectively, the minimum, addition, and subtrac tion of NCF-values. In order to see that this is no accident, we have to move for a mo- Theorem 2: Let .!'I be a finite field of propostuons. Then, for any non-standard .!'I N C F 12 1c: and for any infinitesimal z there is a non-standard probability measure P such that for all A,Be .!'I 1c:(BIA) = n iff P(BIA) is of the same order as z" (i.e. P(B IA)Iz" is finite, but not infinitesimal). In particular we have: whenever P (C) = P (A) + P (B), then 1c:(C) = min{K(A),K(B)} ; when P(C) = P(A) P(B), then 1c:(C) = 1c:(A) + 1c:(B); 1c:(BIA) = K(Af""' B) -1c:(A), as desired; and whatever is (conditionally) independent w.r.t. P, is so also w.r.t. 1c:.
It is thus not surpnsmg that the laws of the concepts introduced in the previous section are simply translations · of the law: s of the corresponding probabilistic con cepts. For instance, the theorem of total probability translates into this (where A 1 •... ,A s partition W):
Bayes' theorem yields this (with A 1 •... ,A s as before):
Also, the probabilistic laws of independence and conditional independence hold for NCFs -e.g.: These observations have a considerable import. For instance, the theory of probabilistic causation has turned out to be to a large extent a theory of conditional stochastic independence. 1 4 NCFs would thus allow to extend these ideas to a theory of deterministic causation. In the present context, the crucial observation is, however, that conditional independence is an essential mean for making probability measures computationally manageable. This carries over to the implementation of NCFs. Moreover, all the 'results and . techniques related to such key words as "influence dia gram". "Markov field", "caus a l graph", etc. 15 may be . 15 I mention only Kiiveri et al. (198 4 ) and Pearl (1986) . Of course, references could be easily extended. particular, Pearl (1986) has shown how probabilistic belief change or updating may be processed in parallel, and Hunter (1988) has given a variant way how to achieve parallel updating of NCFs.
This does not mean that there are no differences. Certainly, NCF-theory is computationally simpler than probability theory. And when only subjective judge ments of experts are to be implemented, it may be· easier to elicit these subjective judgements in the coarser terms of NCFs. On the other hand, relative frequencies are so intimately tied to probabilities that I don't see how to reasonably deal with statisti cal data within an NCF-framework.
4.
Other comparisons
Though many have proposed representations of epistemic states different from a probabilistic one, I have, to my surprise, nowhere found the simple structure de scribed in section 2. Perhaps the reason is that the importance of stating general and precise rules of belief change, which are tantamount to a theory of induction, has often not been clearly recognized. In any case, this will be my standard criticism of the further comparisons pursued here.
(.a) Various ,logics
The following idea for modelling belief. change has attracted many: Suppose a lan guage with a conditional � ' to be given; represent an epistemic state by a (consistent and deductively closed) set s I of sentences of that language; and define the change sA of S through information A as SA = {B I A� B e S} _ 16 Of course, this idea crucially de pends on the properties of �. E.g., � must not be interpreted as material implication.
Strict implication will do neither; all the conditionals in the various many-valued logics that have been proposed are unsuited, tool 7 ; and even the conditionals of the variants of relevance logic tum out to be unhelpfu J . 18 The best conditional for this purpose is that of conditional logic. Many semantics of conditional logic basically use a well-ordering of possible worlds (or something equivalent or similar). 1 9 But they don't use numbers and their arithmetical properties. Thus, there arise · problems with iterated belief change, and no equally adequate concept of indepen dence is defined. within that framework. 20 . Finally, epistemic changes as defined in Definition 4 seem completely inaccessible to the whole strategy.
(b) Plausibility measures
One of the first to propose formal alternatives to the beaten tracks of probability theory � as Shackle with his functions of potential surprise. 2 1 Such a function is a 16 This is the · so-called Ramsey test, most thoroughly propounded by Giirdenfors, e.g. in his (l984) and (1986): See also ·Rott, forthcoming.
1 1 As may be easily confirmed with the help of the list in Rescher (1969) .
18 In order to substantiate this remark, we would have to discuss Anderson, Belnap (1975) .
These remarks are not meant as a criticism, because all the conditionals mentioned were not de signed for the present purpose.
19 Cf., e.g., Lewis ( 197 3 ) and the overview in Nute ( 1980) . 20 As is more fully explained in my (1988) . · 21 Most extensively presented in Shackle ( 1969) . (9) and (10) are identical with (1) and (2), and (8) arbitrarily fixes the-maximal degree of potential surprise to Qe 1. Thus, Shackle's and my functions only differ in their ranges. This is not a mere technicality, however. There is reason to accept the generalization of (2) or (10) to countable unions (without weakening min to inf), and this forces the range of these functions to be well-ordered. Moreover, I have de liberately avoided a maximal degree of disbelief, because, whenever a proposition acquires this maximal degree, this is incorrigible and cannot be changed any more, according to all rules of belief change. Thus, I object to the possibility accepted by Shackle that propositions different from 0 have maximal potential surprise .
The essential point, however, is that Shackle didn't get a grip on conditionaliza tion. This is clear from his proposal (11) y(AnB) = max{y(A),y(BIA)} , where he left y(BIA) in fact undefined.
Similar remarks apply to the plausibility indexing proposed by Rescher, e.g. in his (1976) , and to the inductive probability of Cohen (1977) (which is not mathemati cal ·probability).
(c ) Shafer Shafer (1976) , p.224, shows that Shackle's theory is a special case of his: the func tion y is a degree of doubt . derived from a consonant belief function in the sense of Shafer iff it satisfies (8)-(10); Since Dempster's rule of combination governs belief change for Shafer's belief functions in general, we may expect it to complete s· hackle's theory. It indeed does, but in a different way than I did in section 2:
According to Shafer (1976) , pp.43+66f., there are also conditional degrees of doubt given by the formulae
Apart from the denominator, this looks like �y Definition 2. However, y(.IA) here represents the degree of doubt which results from combining the old belief function with the belief function Bel defined by: Be . l(B) = 
(d) Fuzzy logic
The NCF-formalism seems quite incomparable to fuzzy logic. This is more perspi cuous when we notice that Zadeh's preferred base logic for his fuzzy logic is Lukasiewicz' logic with infinitely many truth-values 22 , which. as noted in (a) . is quite different from NCF-theory. Indeed. both theories also seem intuitively incom parable. Fuzzy logic deals with vague expressions and approximate reasoning. But inductive reasoning as such need in no way be vague or approximate; nor is rea soning inductive simply because it is approximate. Thus, I think that the two theo ries just have different intended applications. This, however, does not rule out the possibility that there is a reasonable and useful fuzzification of NCF-theory.2 3 Bibliography
